Deviator Detection under Imperfect Monitoring

12/27/2017
by   Dietmar Berwanger, et al.
0

Grim-trigger strategies are a fundamental mechanism for sustaining equilibria in iterated games: the players cooperate along an agreed path, and as soon as one player deviates, the others form a coalition to play him down to his minmax level. A precondition to triggering such a strategy is that the identity of the deviating player becomes common knowledge among the other players. This can be difficult or impossible to attain in games where the information structure allows only imperfect monitoring of the played actions or of the global state. We study the problem of synthesising finite-state strategies for detecting the deviator from an agreed strategy profile in games played on finite graphs with different information structures. We show that the problem is undecidable in the general case where the global state cannot be monitored. On the other hand, we prove that under perfect monitoring of the global state and imperfect monitoring of actions, the problem becomes decidable, and we present an effective synthesis procedure that covers infinitely repeated games with private monitoring.

READ FULL TEXT

page 1

page 2

page 3

page 4

research
02/12/2009

Qualitative Concurrent Stochastic Games with Imperfect Information

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect informati...
research
10/19/2017

Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring...
research
07/03/2023

Synthesising Full-Information Protocols

We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features exp...
research
05/29/2019

Reachability Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), whe...
research
09/16/2018

Observation and Distinction. Representing Information in Infinite Games

We compare two approaches for modelling imperfect information in infinit...
research
05/30/2018

Planning, Inference and Pragmatics in Sequential Language Games

We study sequential language games in which two players, each with priva...
research
11/01/1997

Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making

The model of a non-Bayesian agent who faces a repeated game with incompl...

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset