Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games

by   Pierpaolo Battigalli, et al.

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an unknown state that in reality is an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. Each time, every agent chooses an action that maximizes her subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what she observes. In particular, we assume that each agent only observes her realized payoff. A steady state of such dynamic is a selfconfirming equilibrium given the assumed feedback. We characterize the structure of the set of selfconfirming equilibria in network games and we relate selfconfirming and Nash equilibria. Thus, we provide conditions on the network under which the Nash equilibrium concept has a learning foundation, despite the fact that agents may have incomplete information. In particular, we show that the choice of being active or inactive in a network is crucial to determine whether agents can make correct inferences about the payoff state and hence play the best reply to the truth in a selfconfirming equilibrium. We also study learning dynamics and show how agents can get stuck in non--Nash selfconfirming equilibria. In such dynamics, the set of inactive agents can only increase in time, because once an agent finds it optimal to be inactive, she gets no feedback about the payoff state, hence she does not change her beliefs and remains inactive.


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