Built-in Vulnerabilities to Imperceptible Adversarial Perturbations
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Designing models that are robust to small adversarial perturbations of their inputs has proven remarkably difficult. In this work we show that the reverse problem---making models more vulnerable---is surprisingly easy. After presenting some proofs of concept on MNIST, we introduce a generic tilting attack that injects vulnerabilities into the linear layers of pre-trained networks without affecting their performance on natural data. We illustrate this attack on a multilayer perceptron trained on SVHN and use it to design a stand-alone adversarial module which we call a steganogram decoder. Finally, we show on CIFAR-10 that a state-of-the-art network can be trained to misclassify images in the presence of imperceptible backdoor signals. These different results suggest that adversarial perturbations are not always informative of the true features used by a model.
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