Vote Delegation with Uncertain Number of Voters

02/17/2021
by   Hans Gersbach, et al.
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We examine vote delegation when delegators do not know the preferences of representatives. We show that free delegation favors minorities, that is, alternatives that have a lower chance of winning ex-ante. The same–but to a lesser degree–occurs if the number of voting rights actual voters can have is capped. However, when the number of delegators increases, the probability that the ex-ante minority wins under free and capped delegation converges to the one under conventional voting–albeit non-monotonically. Finally, when the total number of voters is converging to infinity with a fixed fraction of the majority, all three probabilities converge to one, no matter the number of delegators. Therefore, vote delegation is safe on a large scale.

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